A factor analysis approch to measuring European loan and bond market integration by Wagenvoort, Rien et al.
Rien Wagenvoort und André Ebner und Magdalena
Morgese Borys:
A factor analysis approch to measuring European
loan and bond market integration
Munich Discussion Paper No. 2009-20
Department of Economics
University of Munich
Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Online at http://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11071/
 1
A factor analysis approach to measuring European loan and 
bond market integration∗ 
 
 
Rien Wagenvoorta, André Ebnerb,  
and Magdalena Morgese Borysc 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
By using an existing and a new convergence measure, this paper assesses whether bank 
loan and bond interest rates are converging for the non-financial corporate sector across 
the euro area. Whilst we find evidence for complete bond market integration, the market 
for bank loans remains segmented, albeit to various degrees depending on the type and 
size of the loan. Factor analysis reveals that rates on large loans and small loans with 
long rate fixation periods have weakly converged in the sense that, up to a fixed effect, 
their evolution is driven by common factors only. In contrast, the price evolution of small 
loans with short rate fixation periods is still affected by country-specific dynamic factors. 
There are few signs that bank loan rates are becoming more uniform with time. 
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1. Introduction 
 
One of the key objectives of the creation of a single market in Europe has been to 
level the playing field in the corporate sector in order to enhance competition and 
innovation. This is equally true with respect to finance. Despite the introduction of the 
euro and the liberalisation and harmonisation of the regulatory side of the financial 
services industry as a result of two banking directives and the Financial Services Action 
Plan (FSAP), retail banking remains, however, largely a national affair. Cross-border 
retail lending generally accounts for less than one percent of total lending (see Gropp and 
Kashyap, 2009). This de facto national segmentation justifies the use of national bank 
lending rates to assess whether or not the costs of corporate debt financing are 
converging across the euro area. This paper aims at precisely that.  
Previous studies (see, among others, Adam et al., 2002; Baele et al., 2004; Kleimeier 
and Sander, 2006; Vajanne, 2007) so far have found evidence for falling cross-country 
variance in loan rates (σ -convergence) but little or ambiguous evidence for stationarity 
of loan rate spreads to a benchmark (lack of β -convergence). On the one hand, σ -
convergence suggests that the process of bank market integration is ongoing. On the 
other hand, the β -convergence results do not exclude the fact that loan rates may drift 
apart. For example, by estimating cointegration relationships Kleimeier and Sander 
(2006) find that all bi-lateral relationships between German rates and other national rates 
are unstable, showing absence of convergence.  
We introduce an additional convergence measure to reassess whether retail bank 
market integration is absent, ongoing, or complete. Note that both the σ -convergence 
and β -convergence criteria capture long-term trends. There is also the question of 
whether rates move synchronously in their short-term fluctuations. Such correlation 
would be the result of national rates following common external factors, for example the 
European Central Bank (ECB) re-financing rate. In an integrated market national factors 
should not play a significant role, insofar as they are unrelated to country-specific risk or 
heterogeneity in demand for financial services.  
This brings us to the concept of factor convergence. Factor analysis is applied to 
decompose the loan rates in a number of latent factors where each factor is multiplied by 
country-specific factor sensitivities, so-called ‘factor loadings’. Loan rates are said to 
exhibit (weak) factor convergence when all factor loadings are significant and all 
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loadings associated with one common factor have the same sign. There are, then, no 
statistically significant country-specific dynamic factors. Factor convergence is complete 
when factor loadings are the same for all countries (= strong factor convergence). Factor 
convergence is absent when some factor loadings (of a significant factor) are 
insignificant or of different sign. Note that factor convergence captures the 
synchronisation of interest rate movements but ignores time-invariant differences in the 
absolute levels. The latent factors are found by maximum likelihood factor analysis 
following Jöreskog (1969). Strong factor convergence implies complete β -convergence, 
and vice versa, in the sense that one can find a benchmark rate for which all spreads are 
stationary and white noise. In contrast, weak factor convergence does not necessarily 
imply β -convergence, neither complete nor incomplete. Nor does incomplete β -
convergence, i.e. when spreads are stationary but auto-correlated, imply weak factor 
convergence.  
This study tests the law of one price in the corporate loan market from a lender’s 
point of view. The threat of foreign entry and competition from alternative funding 
sources such as bond financing can be the driving factors enforcing this law. Gropp and 
Kashyap (2009) suggest analysing the convergence of bank profits rather than prices of 
financial products.1 They argue that the absence of homogeneous loan pricing does not 
imply absence of retail banking integration due to differences in tax systems, borrowers’ 
preferences, etc., meaning that the reason for price differences should not necessarily be 
sought on the supply side. This seems a valid point concerning part of the cross-country 
differences in loan rates.  
In addition to differences in tax and legal systems, interest rate differences may stem 
from a variety of other factors. First, national bank loan portfolios may differ in their risk 
profile. Idiosyncratic risk is diversified but systematic (countrywide) risk may differ, 
especially when the share of small businesses in the loan portfolio is high. Second, 
differences in inflation expectations may affect nominal rates. This effect is likely to be 
increasing in the share of local bank investors, because real returns must take into 
account consumer price inflation in the investor’s country of residence. International 
investors holding well-diversified portfolios are less affected by cross-country 
differences in both inflation and risk. Third, there can be heterogeneity in loan products 
                                                 
1 This is not a solution for our case. Total bank profitability may not be informative about the corporate 
loan market since bank profitability is also driven by other business lines such as investment banking, 
residential mortgages, deposits and other financial services. 
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across countries due, for instance, to differences in collateral practices (see ECB, 2006). 
Fourth, there can be differences in deposit rates. This could lead to differences in loan 
rates even if the interest mark-up was the same.  
Since the objective of this paper is to assess whether there is a level playing field in 
firm debt financing, and not to explain differences (as Affinito and Farabullini, 2009) 
do), loan rates should not be adjusted for differences in competitive conditions (see 
Maudos and Guevara, 2004) or cost efficiency (see, among others, Casu et al., 2004; 
Schure et al., 2004) in banking. However, we adjust loan rates for differences in 
systematic risk (first factor) and inflation (second factor) to the extent that these variables 
can explain variation in loan rates across countries and over time. Unfortunately there is 
no obvious way of adjusting national loan rates for heterogeneity in loan products (third 
factor). Country fixed effects could capture at least part of such heterogeneity, but could 
also be attributed to many other factors, including those for which one should not adjust 
such as bank inefficiency. Hence, no adjustment is made for the third factor. Finally, in 
many cases differences in rates on Non-Financial Corporations’ (NFCs) deposits (fourth 
factor) cannot account for differences in loan rates. In fact for some countries where loan 
rates are relatively high, deposit rates are relatively low. This means that mark-up 
differences can be even bigger than differences in loan rates. The cross-country 
relationship between deposit rates and loan rates is statistically insignificant, which made 
us decide to ignore deposit rates. 
Thus, we suggest evaluating market integration against various measures of risk-
adjusted price convergence. One approach is to test whether the median risk-adjusted 
interest rate level is the same across countries (α -convergence). The α -convergence 
measure captures time-invariant differences such as those caused by the tax and legal 
system. The σ -convergence and β -convergence measures capture some of the long-
term aspects of the integration process while factor convergence also accounts for short-
term movements. Although data limitations do not allow us to determine the precise 
reasons for possible incompleteness of bank market integration, the use of different 
convergence measures, in particular the factor convergence measure, could give some 
indication. For instance, if interest rates exhibit factor convergence but no α -
convergence then explanations should rather be found in institutional differences than on 
the supply side. 
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We distinguish between small and large bank loans because small loans are 
dominated by small businesses which are more likely to suffer from monopolistic loan 
pricing than large scale enterprises (LSEs). In comparison to LSEs, small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) are often more information opaque. This makes the financing of 
SMEs especially challenging since asymmetric information may create adverse selection 
and moral hazard problems (see Akerlof, 1970). The sensitivity of firm growth to 
cashflow rises as firm size falls (see Carpenter and Petersen, 2002, and Wagenvoort, 
2003) for evidence on firms in the USA and the European Union respectively), which 
may suggest that SMEs encounter finance constraints that prevent them from fully 
exploiting their growth potential. One way of reducing asymmetric information is to 
build long relationships with creditors. However, these bank-firm relationships can be 
exploited to extract monopoly rents from the firms.2 For instance, Degryse and Van 
Cayseele (2000) find for small European businesses that interest rates on loans tend to 
increase with the duration of a bank-firm relationship. 
For the purpose of benchmarking, we also apply the various convergence measures to 
the primary euro-denominated corporate bond market. A sample of 828 plain-vanilla 
fixed coupon bonds issued between January 1999 and October 2008 by NFCs in France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom is compiled from the Dealogic 
Bondware data set. The yield-to-maturity of these bonds is adjusted for differences in 
credit risk before applying the convergence measures. In accordance with the findings of 
Gabbi and Sironi (2005), our empirical results suggest that the expected secondary 
market liquidity is not a significant determinant of primary market bond yields when 
liquidity is measured by bond size. Hence, despite finding evidence for a negative 
relationship between transaction issuance costs and bond size, there is no need to adjust 
the bond yields for liquidity. 
Our analysis indicates that the primary euro-denominated bond market can be 
considered fully integrated since the introduction of the euro. Bond yields move 
synchronously, i.e. exhibit strong factor convergence, and median yields are equal across 
countries. In contrast, our results show that the market for bank loans remains segmented 
albeit to various degrees depending on the type and size of the loan. Small loans with 
short rate fixation periods are least integrated, indicating that SMEs do not experience a 
level playing field in their debt financing costs. 
                                                 
2 Boot (2000) provides a survey of relationship banking. 
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The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 formalises the different convergence 
measures and presents the adopted econometric approaches. Section 3 describes the data 
sets. The risk and inflation adjustment regressions are shown in Section 4 and Section 5 
presents the convergence analysis. Section 6 concludes by summarizing the main 
findings. 
 
 
2. Convergence measures and econometric approaches 
 
Interest rate convergence can be viewed in different ways which together provide us 
with a more complete picture of the process. One approach is to test whether the median 
interest rate level is the same across countries (α -convergence). Another approach is to 
test whether differences between rates are becoming smaller over time (σ -convergence) 
and/or whether these differences are stationary ( β -convergence), i.e. do not contain 
long-term trends. Finally, this paper introduces a new approach by testing for the 
irrelevance of country-specific dynamic factors in the short- and long-term evolution of 
interest rates (factor convergence). 
 
2.1. α-convergence 
 
Let ),...,( 1 Tiii rrmedianr =  where tir  is the interest rate in period t ( 1,..., )t T= of 
country i  ( 1,..., )i N= . Then, differences in interest rate levels can be measured by: 
 
1( ,..., ), 1,...,i i Nr median r r i Nα = − =                                     (1) 
 
The non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis (1952) test of median equality is applied to infer the 
joint statistical significance of ( 1,..., )i i Nα = . We speak of α -convergence when the 
median interest rates are equal across countries.  
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2.2. σ-convergence 
 
Let 1var( ,..., ).t t tNr rσ =  The trend in tσ  can be estimated by OLS of the regression 
model: 
, 1,...,t ta bt t Tσ ε= + + = ,                                            (2) 
 
where t is a time trend, a  is a constant and tε  is an error term. We speak of σ -
convergence when the estimate of parameter b on the time trend is significantly negative, 
which would suggest that the process of integration is ongoing. 
 
2.3. β-convergence 
 
Let ttiti Brs −=  where tB  is a benchmark rate in period t. The stationarity of the 
spreads tis  can be tested by OLS estimation of the error correction model: 
 
1, ,
1
, 1,...,
L
ti i i t i j t j i ti
j
s s s t Tη β δ ε− −
=
Δ = + + Δ + =∑                              (3) 
 
where iη  is a country-specific fixed effect, tiε  is an error term, jδ  are parameters on the 
time-lagged change in spreads and iβ  is the unit root parameter. In the setup of the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test (see Dickey and Fuller, 1979), Equation (3) is 
estimated country by country. The spreads are stationary when iβ ( 1,..., )i N=  are in the 
domain [-1, 0) while there is a unit root when at least one of the iβ  is zero. Convergence 
is complete when iβ  equal -1 for all countries. In this case interest rate deviations from 
the benchmark rate are white noise. We speak of β -convergence when all spreads are 
stationary. Sooner or later loan rates will then return to the benchmark rate up to the 
fixed country-specific effect. Complete β -convergence implies complete market 
integration. Under complete β -convergence, shocks to loan rates do not persist for more 
than one period. 
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A known weakness of the ADF test for single time series is its low power in small 
samples. Simulations have shown that the power of panel unit root tests can be 
considerably higher. We therefore apply recently developed panel unit root tests, i.e. the 
Hadri (2000) test, the Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) test and the Im, Pesaran and Shin 
(2003) test. These tests differ especially in the null (H0) and alternative (H1) hypotheses. 
In the case of the Hadri test all time series are stationary under H0 while all series have 
unit roots under H1. In contrast, in the case of the LLC and IPS tests all series have a unit 
root under H0. The LLC test rejects H0 only when all series are stationary whereas the 
IPS test rejects H0 when at least one series is stationary. 
 
2.4. Factor convergence 
 
Incomplete β -convergence may be the result of short-term movements in interest 
rates due to country-specific dynamic factors. To test for the statistical significance of 
common and non-common factors we perform maximum likelihood factor analysis (see 
Jöreskog, 1969). That is, the interest rates are decomposed into: 
 
1 1 2 2 ... , 1,..., ;  1,...,ti i i t i t Ki Kt tir a l F l F l F i N t Tε= + + + + + = =                   (4) 
 
where ia  is a country-specific constant, KFF ,...,1  are K  latent factors, Kii ll ,...,1  are the 
associated country-specific factor loadings and tiε  denotes white noise error. We use the 
EM algorithm (see, Rubin and Thayer 1982) to maximise the likelihood function. 
Confidence intervals are estimated by Efron’s (1979) bootstrap. Factor k is considered 
statistically insignificant when the 99% confidence intervals of all loadings 1,...,k kNl l  
include zero and considered statistically significant when the 99% confidence interval of 
at least one loading does not include zero. Factors can thus be country-specific while not 
being part of the errors. Loading kil  on factor k associated with country i  is considered 
statistically significantly different from loading kjl  associated with country j when at 
least one of the two loadings is outside the 99% confidence interval of the other loading. 
Interest rates are said to exhibit (weak) factor convergence when all factor loadings 
are significant and all loadings associated with one factor have the same sign. There are 
then no statistically significant country-specific dynamic factors. However, interest rates 
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may not respond with the same strength to the common factors. For example, when the 
ECB refinancing rate goes down, loan rates in all countries go down but by more in some 
countries than in others. Convergence is complete when factor loadings are the same for 
all countries, in which case there can be only one significant factor. We then speak of 
strong factor convergence. Under strong factor convergence interest rates move fully 
synchronously both in the short and long run in the sense that there are no systematic 
effects in bi-lateral interest rate differences up to a constant. 
 
Definition 1 (weak factor convergence): For all statistically significant factors 
[ ]Kk ,...,1∈ , sign ( kil ) = sign ( kjl ) [ ], 1,...,i j N∀ ∈  and [ ]0 1,...,il i N≠ ∀ ∈ . 
 
Definition 2 (strong factor convergence): For all statistically significant factors 
[ ]Kk ,...,1∈ , [ ]pkjpkjki lll −∈ 1,  [ ], 1,...,i j N∀ ∈  and [ ]0 1,...,il i N≠ ∀ ∈ , where [ ]pkjpkj ll −1,  is 
the ( p21− ) percent confidence interval associated with the estimate of the loading kjl . 
 
Table 1 provides an overview of the relationships between the various convergence 
measures. We first compare factor convergence with existing measures. Strong factor 
convergence implies complete β -convergence, and vice versa, in the sense that one can 
find a benchmark rate for which all spreads are stationary and white noise. In contrast, 
weak factor convergence does not necessarily imply β -convergence, neither complete 
nor incomplete. Indeed, loan rates may exhibit weak factor convergence but still drift 
apart due to differences in factor loadings. Nor does incomplete β -convergence, i.e. 
when spreads are stationary but auto-correlated, imply weak factor convergence. 
Stationary loan rates may still have persistent country specific components in short-term 
interest rate movements. Strong factor convergence further implies the absence of σ -
convergence, for σ -convergence requires differences in factor loadings. When all factor 
loadings are equal then there is no σ -convergence. Going in the other direction, the 
absence of σ -convergence, however, is not a sufficient condition for either weak or 
strong factor convergence, again due to possible persistent country specific components 
in short-term interest rate movements. Factor convergence and α -convergence are 
unrelated in the sense that one can hold with or without the other. 
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Table 1 Relationships between convergence measures. 
 α  
 
σ  Absence 
of σ  
Incomplete 
β  
Complete 
β  
Weak 
Factor 
Strong 
Factor 
α  
 
       
σ  
  
      
Absence  
of σ    
     
Incomplete 
β     
    
Complete 
β      
   
Weak 
Factor       
  
Strong 
Factor       
 
Notes: For convergence measures X and Y:  
X     Y: X implies Y but Y does not necessarily imply X.  
X     Y: Y implies X but X does not necessarily imply Y.  
X     Y: X implies Y, and Y implies X.  
X     Y: X does not necessarily imply Y, and Y does not necessarily imply X. 
 
Xs are in the first column, Ys in the first row.  
 
We next compare the existing measures only. Complete β -convergence implies the 
absence of σ -convergence because in that case interest rate deviations from the 
benchmark are white noise with constant variance for all rates.3 This relationship does 
                                                 
3 Strictly speaking, one could observe σ -convergence while interest rates exhibit complete β -
convergence if and only if the errors in Equation (3) are heteroskedastic. In this case, σ -convergence does 
not indicate that the trends in interest rates are converging but indicates that the deviations from the trends 
are falling in absolute value. This is not a common interpretation of σ -convergence. 
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not hold in the other direction since the absence of σ -convergence does not necessarily 
imply that all interest rates are stationary. For example, some interest rates may converge 
to the benchmark rate which lowers the cross-sectional variance, while other rates may 
diverge from the benchmark which increases the cross-sectional variance. These effects 
on the cross-sectional variance may offset each other while some interest rates are non-
stationary. Incomplete β -convergence is not a sufficient condition for the absence of σ -
convergence since stationary interest rates may still converge. Indeed, a (non-linear) 
trend in the interest rate spread that dies out over time is stationary. σ -convergence is 
thus unrelated to incomplete β -convergence. There can be σ -convergence even when 
some of the interest rates are non-stationary. Finally, both β -convergence and σ -
convergence are unrelated to α -convergence.  
 
 
3. Data description 
 
3.1. Bank loan interest rates 
 
This paper analyses monthly interest rates on new business lending to Non-Financial 
Corporations (NFCs) in eleven euro area countries. New lending includes re-negotiated 
loans but excludes previously negotiated loans with automatic rate re-setting. Since 
January 2003 the ECB has reported harmonised interest rates of Monetary Financial 
Institutions (MFIs) in the euro area. To get more history, non-harmonised interest rates 
compiled by the National Central Banks (NCBs) are chain linked with the harmonised 
MFI interest rates compiled by the ECB. This allows us to construct (risk-adjusted) series 
that go back to October 1997. Appendix A contains a methodological note with the 
details of the variable construction.  
Loan rates are separately reported for loans with an initial rate fixation period up to 
one year, hereafter called short loans (STL = Short-Term Loans and long-term loans with 
short rate fixation periods), and loans with rate fixations periods of more than one year, 
hereafter called long loans (LTL = Long-Term Loans with long rate fixation periods). 
Note that short loans include long-term variable rate loans but exclude overdrafts. 
Interest rates for different loan sizes are only available for the harmonized ECB statistics. 
Small loans do not exceed EUR 1 million. To some extent large loans (above EUR 1 
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million) are dominated by large firms with 250 employees or more. Short-Term and 
long-term variable rate Small Loans (STSL) and Short-Term and long-term variable rate 
Large Loans (STLL) are available for all eleven countries. Portuguese rates on Long-
Term Small Loans with long rate fixation periods (LTSL) and Belgian, Greek and 
Portuguese rates on Long-Term Large Loans with long rate fixation periods (LTLL) are 
missing. Table 10 of Appendix C contains basic descriptive statistics of the bank loan 
interest rate series (before risk adjustment).  
Figure 1a shows the evolution in short and long interest rates on NFC loans between 
October 1997 and September 2008. There is clear evidence of short and long interest rate 
convergence until the end of the year 2000. Convergence of loan rates during this period 
partly reflects the anchoring of inflation expectations at lower and more similar levels 
thanks to the single currency and the common monetary policy. However, even after 
correcting the series for differences in inflation (see next section), the ending of a period 
of strong interest rate convergence in some countries leads to structural breaks. Visual 
inspection of Figure 1a seems to indicate that, since 2001, interest rates have been 
moving almost in parallel, suggesting that convergence is nearly complete up to a 
constant difference in average rates. By applying the convergence measures discussed in 
the previous section over the period January 2001 – September 2008 this is tested 
formally in Section 5. 
 
Fig. 1a. Developments in NFC loan rates (in %), non-harmonised series. 
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Figure 1b depicts the evolution in harmonized interest rates by rate fixation period 
and loan size. Two broad patterns can be detected by comparing loan sizes (Panel A with 
panel B and Panel C with Panel D): first, small loan rates are substantially higher than 
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large loan rates. On average, small loan rates exceed large loan rates by about 75 basis 
points (b.p.) on both short and long loans. The empirical findings of both Dietsch (2003) 
and Wagenvoort (2003) suggest that from a portfolio credit risk viewpoint this may not 
be justified. A portfolio of loans to small firms is not necessarily riskier than a portfolio 
of loans to large firms, even when small firms individually are riskier than large firms. 
Second, the cross-country variance of small loan rates is higher than the variance of large 
loan rates. Rates on large loans are thus more uniform across the euro area than rates on 
small loans. Comparing rate fixation periods (Panel A with Panel C and Panel B with 
Panel D), we find that rate levels are generally lower, but that cross-country variances are 
higher on short than on long loans. Long-term rates with long rate fixation periods are 
thus more uniform than short rates. 
 
Fig. 1b. Developments in NFC loan rates (in %), harmonised series. 
Panel A: STSL
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There is no single country that persistently has the lowest rate for any of the loan 
categories. Loan rates are generally higher in Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy and 
Portugal than in Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, the Netherlands and Spain. Part of 
these cross-country differences in nominal loan rates can be explained by differences in 
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macroeconomic risk and inflation. In Section 4 we adjust the loan rates for these 
conditions. 
 
3.2. Primary bond yields 
 
From the Dealogic Bondware data warehouse we construct a data set of primary 
market yields on euro-denominated bonds issued by NFCs between January 1999 and 
October 2008. After risk adjustment (see next section), quarterly averages of the yield to 
maturity are computed by nationality of the companies. Our sample of 828 plain-vanilla 
fixed coupon bonds has 0, 3, 9, 4, and 3 missing quarters for France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom respectively, out of a total of 40 quarters per 
country. We decided to restrict the number of countries to these five so that the share of 
missing quarters would not exceed 25 percent of observations per country. By enlarging 
this group with other euro area countries, the share of missing quarters in the country 
with the least frequent bond issuance would exceed that figure. Note that in four out of 
the five countries only 10 percent or less of the observations are missing. Missing values 
in the quarterly series are estimated by inter- and extrapolation of the neighbouring 
observations. Table 11 of Appendix C shows the main characteristics of the 828 bonds 
for which face values vary between EUR 20 million and EUR 20 billion. 
 
 
4. Adjusting interest rates for risk 
 
4.1. Adjusting bank loan rates for systematic risk and inflation 
 
We measure systematic risk )( tiR  by the standard deviation of (year on year) GDP 
growth rates over the last twelve quarters as a negative relationship can be expected 
between the aggregate default rate on national loan portfolios and economic growth. 
Actual default rates are not publicly available. Actual inflation over the last twelve 
months is taken as a proxy for inflation expectations )( tiI .
4 In a first step the loan rates 
                                                 
4 Both inflation and GDP growth data are from Eurostat. The frequency of the data is monthly and 
quarterly respectively. 
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)( tir  are regressed on these two macroeconomic variables and a set of year dummies in a 
single equation: 
 
TtNiDbIbRbcr tittititi ,...,1,,...,1,321 ==++++= ε                        (5) 
 
where c  is a constant, tD  is a matrix of year dummies, 1b  and 2b  are parameters, 3b  is a 
)1( −T -vector of parameters, and tiε  is an error term. The loan rates are then adjusted as 
follows: 
 
)(~)(~~ 21 tjtitjtititi IIbRRbrr −−−−=                                        (6) 
 
where tir~  is the adjusted loan rate, 1
~b  and 2
~b   are OLS estimates of Equation (5) and 
country j is chosen as benchmark country.  
 
Table 2 OLS regression results used for the risk adjustment of bank loan rates. 
STL LTL STSL STLL LTSL LTLL
Constant 3.99*** 5.63*** 4.67*** 4.32*** 5.02*** 5.32***
Systematic risk 0.21*** 0.06 0.45*** 0.58*** 0.33*** 0.24***
Inflation 0.41*** 0.01 0.30*** 0.15*** 0.15*** -0.04
N 10 6 11 11 10 8
T 132 132 69 69 69 69
Observations (NxT) 1320 792 759 759 690 552
Adjusted R² 0.56 0.70 0.64 0.86 0.66 0.72
Oct. 1997 - Sept. 2008 Jan. 2003 - Sept. 2008
Notes: Parameters that are significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% level are indicated with 
*, **, and *** respectively. The regressions include year dummies (not shown). In the case of LTL and 
LTLL, two additional variables are included: the systemic risk variable and the inflation variable both 
interacted with a dummy variable for Spain (not shown). See Appendix D for a glossary. 
 
Table 2 contains the regression results. Both systematic risk and inflation affect loan 
rates significantly and positively except in the case of Long-term Large Loans with long 
rate fixation periods (LTLL) where the parameter on inflation is not significantly 
different from zero at the 10% level. Our model explains between 64% (STSL) and 86% 
(STLL) of the variation in harmonised loan rates.  
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Fig. 2. Average systematic risk and inflation adjustment of loan rates (in basis points). 
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Notes: See Appendix D for a glossary 
 
Using Germany as a benchmark, average adjustments are relatively small (i.e. less 
than 25 basis points) for most countries (see Figure 2). Harmonized rates are negatively 
adjusted by more than 25 b.p. in the cases of Greece and Ireland only, bringing those 
high-rate countries closer to the other countries. Depending on loan category, French 
rates are positively adjusted between 11 b.p. and 22 b.p. This reduces the bi-lateral 
differences in loan rates between France and Germany. In the case of STL (non-
harmonized) rates, the risk adjustment exceeds 25 b.p. for Greece (-80 b.p.), Ireland (-91 
b.p.), Italy (-30 b.p.), Netherlands (-27 b.p.), Portugal (-48 b.p.) and Spain (-53 b.p.). No 
adjustment is made for the LTL category as neither risk nor inflation are statistically 
significant in Table 2. 
The bank market integration analysis of the Section 5 is performed on the risk and 
inflation adjusted rates. 
 
4.2. Adjusting bond yields for credit risk and liquidity 
 
Let iSpread  be the difference between the yield to maturity )( iy  of bond i  and the 
corresponding swap rate with the same maturity, both at the bond issuance date. The 
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unbalanced sample of 828 bonds is used to regress the bond spread on variables that 
capture expected secondary market liquidity and credit risk. The liquidity of bond i  is 
measured by the natural logarithm of its face value )( iF . Credit risk is picked up by 
various variables including the bonds’ credit rating at issue, time to maturity )( iM , and 
coupon )( iC . We expect higher credit risk on bonds with higher coupon and longer 
maturity.  
Table 3 shows the OLS estimates of the following linear model: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 ,   1,...,i i i i t iSpread c b A b BBB b BB b NR b M b C b F b D i Nε= + + + + + + + + + =   (7) 
 
where c  is a constant, tD  is a matrix of year dummies, 71 ,...,bb  are parameters, 8b  is a 
)1( −T -vector of parameters, A is a dummy variable for bonds rated A, BBB is a dummy 
variable for bonds rated BBB, BB is a dummy variable for bonds rated BB or lower, NR 
is a dummy variable for bonds without rating or bonds for which ratings are missing in 
Bondware, and tiε  is an error term. Rating dummies are defined with respect to bonds 
rated AA and AAA. In accordance with the findings of Gabbi and Sironi (2005), we find 
that bond spreads rise significantly with lower credit ratings and higher coupons, and that 
bond size is not a significant determinant of bond spreads. However, in contrast with 
Gabbi and Sironi (2005) and with our expectations, bond spreads fall with higher 
maturity.5 This effect is only significant when ratings and coupons are included in the 
regression and when bonds with maturities of longer than 10 years are included in the 
sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 The most important differences between our sample and model specification and those of Gabbi and 
Sironi (2005), hereafter abbreviated as GS, are as follows. First, our sample is restricted to bonds 
denominated in euros while the GS sample is restricted to Eurobonds but denominated in different 
currencies. We compute bond spreads to the corresponding swap rates while GS compute bond spreads to 
the corresponding Treasury bond rates. Finally, GS include a larger number of explanatory variables. Our 
more condensed model, however, is sufficiently developed to capture the key differences in credit risk. 
 18
Table 3 OLS regression results used for the risk adjustment of bond yields. 
Parameter t-value
Constant -2.89 -9.55
A 0.22 5.48
BBB 0.35 8.25
BB,B 0.92 7.72
No rating 0.48 7.85
Years to maturity -0.03 -8.60
Coupon spread to swap 0.72 35.39
Natural log of face value -0.02 -1.32
Observations 828
Adjusted R2 0.81  
Notes: The regressions include year dummies (not shown). Dummy variables for ratings are defined with 
respect to the class of AA and AAA. Period: January 1999 – October 2008. 
 
Using only the statistically significant variables in Table 3, the bond yields are 
adjusted for credit risk as follows: 
 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−⎟⎠
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⎛ −−−−−−= ∑∑
==
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ii
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1
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1
54321
1~1~~~~~~     (8) 
 
where iy~  is the adjusted yield to maturity, and 61
~,...,~ bb  are OLS estimates of Equation 
(7). Figure 3 depicts the quarterly averages of the risk-adjusted bond yields that are used 
in the convergence analysis of the next section. As shown by the figure, there are no 
apparent systematic differences in risk-adjusted yields across countries, neither in the 
short-term nor in the long-term. 
 
Fig. 3. Quarterly averages of risk-adjusted bond yields (in %). 
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5. Measuring financial market integration 
 
In the following we apply the four convergence measures outlined in Section 2 to the 
balanced samples of monthly (risk and inflation adjusted) bank loan rates and quarterly 
(credit risk adjusted) bond yields. 
 
5.1. α-convergence: are borrowing costs on average equal across countries? 
 
To assess whether corporate borrowers in Europe pay on average the same interest 
rate, we compare the median level of interest rates across countries using the Kruskal-
Wallis (KW) test. The KW test converges asymptotically to the chi-squared distribution 
with N-1 degrees of freedom where N denotes the number of interest rates. The critical 
percentiles associated with the one percent significance level are shown in the last row of 
Table 4. 
 
Table 4 Differences in median risk-adjusted rates (α  in basis points). 
Bonds
STL LTL STSL STLL LTSL LTLL
Jan. 99 - Oct. 08
Austria 18 -6 0 -48 -1
Belgium -7 4 -15 -32
Finland -6 -2 -3 -5 2
France 0 -57 6 -23 -28 9 -22
Germany 1 27 22 76 25 24 35
Greece 19 78 23 56
Ireland -1 28 0 31 -21 1
Italy 3 1 -8 19 -4 6 -13
Netherlands -10 -58 -33 2 5 32
Portugal 91 160 31
Spain -44 -51 -20 -9 -31 -37
UK -6
countries (N) 5 10 6 11 11 10 8
T 40 93 93 69 69 69 69
3.69
13.28 21.67 15.09 23.21 23.21 21.67 18.48
Kruskal – 
Wallis 127.99 43.31 161.53
Bank loans
Jan. 2003 – Sept. 2008Jan. 2001 – Sept. 2008
46.56 87.41 39.04
2
0.01( 1)Nχ −  
Notes: The Kruskal-Wallis test of median equality converges asymptotically to the chi-squared distribution 
with N-1 degrees of freedom. χ²0.01(N-1) denotes the chi-squared critical value at the 1% significance level. 
The null hypothesis of equal medians is rejected if the test statistic is greater or equal the critical value. See 
Appendix D for a glossary. 
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As is evident from Table 4, the corporate bond market exhibits α -convergence since 
differences between median bond yields are not statistically significant at commonly 
applied significance levels. In addition to interest expenses, NFCs also bear transaction 
costs on their bond financing. Appendix B mentions the main cost components of bond 
issuance and provides some basic descriptive statistics. In accordance with the results on 
interest expenses, transaction costs also are the same across countries when bond size is 
considered. 
In sharp contrast, α -convergence has not been achieved in the bank loan market. The 
Kruskal-Wallis test rejects the equality of medians at the 1% significance level for all 
bank loan categories. Comparing bank loan rates since January 2003, thus focusing on 
the period since which the euro has been well established and national data have been 
harmonised, absolute differences in median levels of risk-adjusted bank loan rates are 
generally larger for small than for large loans, in particular for short loans. Short small 
(STSL) loans were about 100 b.p. more expensive for German than for French firms. The 
median German STSL rate was 76 b.p. above the median country (=Ireland) whereas the 
median French STSL rate was 23 b.p. below. Portuguese firms paid the most ( )160=α  
whereas Dutch firms paid the least ( )33−=α , leading to a difference of almost 200 b.p. 
between minimum and maximum levels. For short large (STLL) loans the differences are 
smaller but German STLL rates are still about 50 b.p. more expensive than those of 
France. Differences of a similar magnitude are observed for long large loans (LTLL).  
Given that the average bank loan rate still varies considerably across the euro area, is 
there evidence that the differences in borrowing costs are diminishing over time and if 
so, how fast?  
 
5.2. σ-convergence: are borrowing costs becoming more uniform over time? 
 
Between January 1999 and October 2008 σ -convergence was absent in the bond 
market. The coefficient on the time trend in Equation (2) is not statistically significant at 
the 10 percent or lower significance level (see Table 5).  
Turning to bank loans, Figure 4a shows the evolution of the cross-country standard 
deviation of loan rates. There is evidence of strong σ -convergence until December 2000 
and weak σ -convergence thereafter. σ -convergence was significant at the 95% level for 
both short (STL) and long (LTL) loans between January 2001 and September 2008. The 
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speed of convergence for this period averaged -2 and -3 b.p. per annum respectively (see 
Table 5). At such speed (say -3 b.p.) and σ -level (say 50 b.p.) at the end of 2000 it 
would have taken 25 more years before 95 percent of the loan rates would have had 
differences smaller than 25 basis points.6  
Figure 4b depicts the evolution of σ  by size category. The STSL σ -line is clearly 
above the lines of the other categories, suggesting that the short small loan segment is the 
least integrated. There are breaks in the series as from January 2008, for short rates in 
particular. As suggested by the graph, σ  is increasing rapidly due to the financial crisis. 
Before the crisis, some series had a weak negative trend. We therefore run the σ -
convergence regression also for the harmonized series separately for different periods: 
one covering the pre-crisis period up to and including December 2007, one covering the 
first nine months of 2008, and one for the whole period between January 2003 and 
September 2008. 
In the five years before the crisis σ -convergence was significant at the 95% level in 
the case of short small and long large loans only. The speed of convergence for this 
period averaged -2 and -4 b.p. per annum respectively which correspond to the trends 
found for the aggregate STL and LTL series starting from 2001. Rather than becoming 
more uniform over time, during 2008 the standard deviation of loan rates actually 
increased rapidly in most cases. Both STSL and STLL σ -levels are now back to pre-
2003 values. The modest σ -convergence in STSL rates registered for the period 2003-
2007 has thus been entirely offset by recent developments. For the full period, σ -
convergence is statistically insignificant for STSL rates. In contrast, in the case of LTLL 
σ -convergence is insignificant in 2008 but remains statistically significant for the full 
period.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Under the assumption that loan rates in period t follow a normal distribution, 95% of the rates have 
differences smaller than 100 b.p., which is reduced to 100-3*25=25 b.p. after 25 years. 
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Table 5 Annual speed of sigma convergence (in basis points). 
Bonds
STL LTL STSL STLL LTSL LTLL
Jan. 99 - Oct. 08 0
Oct. 97 - Dec. 00 -79 -12
Jan. 01 - Sept. 08 -2 -3
Oct. 97 - Sept. 08 -27 -3
Jan. 03 - Dec. 07 -2 -7 -2 0 0 -4
Jan. 08 - Sept. 08 40 0 24 35 11 0
Jan. 03 - Sept. 08 0 -5 0 1 1 -3
Bank loans
Notes: The annual speed is computed as b*12 where b is the regression coefficient on the time trend of 
Equation (2). Insignificant coefficients at the 95% confidence level are set to zero. See Appendix D for a 
glossary. 
 
Fig. 4a. Standard deviation of loan rates (σ  in basis points), non-harmonised series. 
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Notes: See Appendix D for a glossary. 
 
Fig. 4b. Standard deviation of loan rates (σ  in basis points), harmonised series. 
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Notes: See Appendix D for a glossary. 
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In sum, there are few signs that bank loan rates continue to converge. Whether or not 
there are long-term trends in the rate differences is our next convergence criterion. 
 
5.3. β-convergence: are differences between borrowing costs mean-reverting? 
 
The β -convergence measure (see Equation 3) requires the choice of a benchmark 
rate. The empirical findings of Vajanne (2007) underline the difficulty of finding an 
appropriate benchmark. In her study for example, at the 10 percent significance level 
short small bank loans are stationary when the lowest loan rate is taken as the benchmark 
but have a unit root when a market-based swap rate is used. The lowest rate is not 
necessarily the best choice when the idiosyncratic component of this rate is relatively 
high.7 Nor are market rates necessarily a good choice because bank loan rates may 
wander away from market rates without affecting cross-country differences in bank loan 
rates.  
We choose the benchmark rate in period t to be the average interest rate of that 
period. The function of our benchmark rate is to minimize the measured differences 
between the interest rates rather than to set optimal levels to which interest rates are 
expected to converge. 
For this benchmark choice the cross-country differences in risk-adjusted bond yields 
are stationary. Table 6a shows the p-values associated with the different panel unit root 
tests. Both the LLC and the IPS tests reject a unit root in the bond spreads whereas the 
Hadri test does not reject their stationarity at 10 percent or lower significance levels. 
There is thus clear evidence for β -convergence of the bond market. 
Regarding bank loans, it turns out that our β -convergence results are sensitive to the 
type of test used. Both the LLC and the IPS tests reject the null hypothesis of a unit root 
in the loan spreads at commonly used significance levels for all loan categories. In sharp 
contrast the Hadri test rejects the stationarity of all series. Even if there was β -
convergence, the speed of convergence is low as many β -estimates are close to zero (see 
Table 6b). The absolute value of the median β -estimate is higher for large than for small 
loans and higher for long than for short loans suggesting in line with the α -convergence 
                                                 
7 Based on this argument, Dunne et al. (2007) for instance propose France as the benchmark for the euro-
denominated sovereign bond market at most maturities although German bonds have the lowest yields.  
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results, that the market for large loans, long loans in particular, is more integrated than 
the market for small loans. 
 
Table 6a Panel unit root test results for interest rate spreads (p-value).  
Bonds
STL LTL STSL STLL LTSL LTLL
Jan. 99 – Oct. 08
Levin, Lin and 
Chu (2002) 0.004
0.000
Hadri (2000) 0.000
N 5 10 6 11 11 10 8
T 40 93 93 69 69 69 69
Observations 200 930 558 759 759 690 552
Bank loans
0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000
Jan. 2003 – Sept. 2008 Jan. 2001 – Sept. 2008
0.000 0.000
Im, Pesaran and 
Shin (2003) 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.140 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000
Notes:  In the case of the Hadri test, all time series are stationary under H0 while all series have unit roots 
under H1. In contrast, in the case of the LLC and IPS tests all series have a unit root under H0. The LLC test 
rejects H0 only when all series are stationary whereas the IPS test rejects H0 when at least one series is 
stationary. The number of time periods is approximate since the lag-length selection differs according to 
the test used. See Appendix D for a glossary. 
 
Table 6b β-estimates of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller Equation (3).  
Bonds
STL LTL STSL STLL LTSL LTLL
Jan. 99 – Oct. 08
Austria -0.048 * -0.081 * -0.218 -0.382 -0.553
Belgium -0.043 * -0.103 * -0.176 * -0.243
Finland -0.525 -0.119 * -0.046 * -0.390 -0.898
France -0.609 -0.224 -0.039 * -0.038 * -0.262 -0.091 * -0.789
Germany -0.848 -0.092 * -0.126 * -0.185 -0.116 * -0.049 * -0.251 *
Greece -0.406 -0.600 -0.635 -0.818
Ireland -0.040 * -0.625 -0.226 -0.118 * -0.085 * -0.669
Italy -0.462 -0.316 -0.179 * -0.318 -0.299 -0.127 * -0.341
Netherlands -1.021 -0.114 * -0.159 * -0.471 -0.189 * -0.189 *
Portugal -0.349 -0.109 * -0.003 *
Spain -0.135 * -0.071 * -0.084 * -0.170 * -0.093 * -0.089 *
UK -0.758
Median -0.758 -0.124 -0.153 -0.119 -0.176 -0.158 -0.447
T 40 93 93 69 69 69 69
Bank loans
Jan. 2001 – Sept. 2008 Jan. 2003 – Sept. 2008 
Notes: Cases for which the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test rejects the stationarity of the interest rate 
spread at the five percent or higher level are indicated with an asterisk. ADF tests were performed for each 
country separately, using the Schwarz information criterion for lag length selection. The number of time 
periods indicated in the table is therefore approximate. See Appendix D for a glossary. 
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Up to this point we have looked at convergence criteria that capture long-term 
differences and trends. Our next and last criterion measures short-term as well as long-
term systematic differences in the evolution of loan rates. 
 
5.4. Factor convergence: are borrowing costs moving synchronously? 
 
The appealing feature of factor analysis is that factors do not have to be specified ex 
ante as they are estimated jointly with the factor loadings. We increase the number of 
latent factors until the last added factor is statistically insignificant for all countries at the 
1% significance level. No more than two factors can explain all systematic variation in 
the bond yields and the bank loan rates. Our results for a model with two factors are 
shown in Appendix C. Table 12a of Appendix C shows the Maximum Likelihood 
estimates of the factor loadings for the bank loan rates; Table 12b and Table 12c show 
the corresponding 0.5th and 99.5th percentiles of the bootstrapped factor loadings 
respectively. Table 13 contains the factor analysis results for the bond yields.  
In the case of the bond market, a single factor can account for all systematic variation 
in the risk-adjusted bond yields. Furthermore, each factor loading is in the 99 percent 
confidence interval of the other factor loadings. The bond market thus exhibits strong 
factor convergence. There is no systematic deviation of borrowing cost of companies in 
one European country in comparison to the borrowing cost of companies in other 
European countries. 
In the case of bank loan rates, for some countries, but not all, two factors are 
statistically significant for the non-harmonized STL and LTL series, even when only 
observations since January 2001 are selected, i.e. after the structural break in σ -
convergence. Factor convergence is thus here absent. 
There is however evidence for weak factor convergence of bank loan rates for some 
of the harmonized series since January 2003. We find that a single factor can account for 
all systematic variation in the interest rates of loan categories STLL, LTSL and LTLL. In 
these cases factor loadings are all significant and have the same sign. Convergence here 
is weak and not strong since some of the factor loadings are outside the 99 percent 
confidence interval of the other loadings. In other words, although there are no country-
specific dynamic factors that can explain the evolution in the respective series, the 
sensitivities to the common factor are different, leading to systematic differences in the 
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evolution of borrowing costs across countries. In the case of short small loans (STSL) 
two factors are statistically significant. Figure 5 depicts the evolution of these factors. 
The first STSL factor is strikingly similar to the 6-month Euribor inter-bank rate. The 
unique factors that can explain the STLL, LTSL, and LTLL loan rates are almost 
identical to the first STSL factor. The factor loadings on the second STSL factor are, in 
some cases, statistically insignificant while in other cases they are significantly positive 
or negative. This means that STSL loan rates are driven by dynamic factors that are not 
common to all countries. Table 7 summarizes the factor convergence analysis results. 
 
Fig. 5. Factors driving STSL rates and the Euribor rate (in %). 
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Table 7 Factor convergence results. 
Bonds
STL LTL STSL STLL LTSL LTLL
Jan. 99– Oct. 08
None
N 5 10 6 11 11 10 8
T 40 93 93 69 69 69 69
Observations (NxT) 200 930 558 759 759 690 552
Factor convergence Strong None None
Bank loans
Weak Weak Weak
Jan. 2001 –  Sept. 2008 Jan. 2003 – Sept. 2008
Notes: See Appendix D for a glossary. 
 
Why is the market for short small loans less integrated than the market for long small 
loans? Long-term loans presumably provide financing for investment whereas short-term 
loans usually provide working capital. The former loans are more often backed up by 
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collateral than the latter. To the extent that loans with short rate fixation periods contain a 
larger share of working capital type of financing than loans with long rate fixation 
periods, short small loans are more susceptible to information problems and, therefore, 
possibly to distortions in loan pricing. There is no natural law stating that the STSL loan 
market is necessarily more heterogeneous across countries than the other loan markets. 
The explanatory power of the factors is in most cases higher for the bank loan rates 
than for the bond yields. The adjusted R2 showing the share of the variance in risk-
adjusted rates (centred on their mean) that can be explained by the statistically significant 
factors is between 0.67 and 1.00 for the loans (see Table 12a) and between 0.42 and 0.70 
for the bonds (see Table 13). There are two explanations for these differences. Firstly, 
national loan rates are based on a very large number of individual loan rates whereas 
some of the quarterly bond rates represent just one firm. Company specific components 
are thus more important for bonds than for loans. A second and related explanation is the 
fact that a bond yield on a particular day is likely to give an imprecise estimate of the 
average funding conditions during a quarter. Although this should not introduce 
systematic biases, measurement errors are expected to be larger for bonds than for loans. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The novelty of this study is the use it makes of factor analysis to compare NFC 
borrowing costs in the euro area. Our sample of 828 bond issues suggests that integration 
of the primary euro-denominated bond market is complete; there is evidence of α -
convergence, β -convergence, strong factor convergence, and absence of σ -
convergence. In contrast, the market for bank loans remains segmented albeit to various 
degrees depending on the type and size of the loan.  
We find that rates on large bank loans and small bank loans with long rate fixation 
periods exhibit weak factor convergence in the sense that, up to a fixed effect, they are 
driven by common factors only. In contrast, the evolution of short small loan rates is still 
affected by country-specific dynamic factors. To the extent that loans with short rate 
fixation periods contain a larger share of working capital type of financing than loans 
with long rate fixation periods, short small loans are more susceptible to information 
problems and, therefore, possibly to distortions in loan pricing. 
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The factor convergence results resolve some of the ambiguity that follows from β -
convergence results which are sensitive to the type of the panel unit root test used.  
Notable differences remain in the average cost of bank loans across the euro area, in 
particular for small loans with short rate fixation periods where some differences are to 
the order of almost 200 basis points even after adjusting rates for macroeconomic 
conditions such as systematic risk and inflation. α -convergence is rejected for all loan 
categories. 
There are few signs that bank loan rates are becoming more uniform with time. In 
2008 the cross-country variance in loan rates increased as a result of the financial and 
economic crisis, bringing σ -levels on short loans back to pre-2003 values. There is some 
evidence of σ -convergence for long large loans albeit with rates converging at low 
speed. 
To conclude, small businesses do not experience a level playing field in their debt 
financing costs, in particular with respect to the financing of working capital, and there 
are few signs of improvement. Additional policy efforts are therefore needed to make 
retail bank markets more competitive. 
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Appendix A. Methodological note on chain linking NCB and ECB interest rates 
 
This study uses and extends the interest rate time series constructed by Van 
Leuvensteijn et al. (2008). Non-harmonised National Retail Interest Rates (NRIR) 
compiled by the National Central Banks are chain linked with more recent harmonised 
Monetary financial institution Interest Rate statistics (MIR) compiled by the ECB.8 NRIR 
data predominantly feature interest rates on new business loans. For consistency, new 
business rates are therefore also chosen in the MIR data set. New business loans in the 
MIR data set include re-negotiated credits but exclude previously negotiated credits with 
automatic rate re-setting. There can still be some differences between NRIR and MIR 
data. For example, we exclude overdraft rates from our MIR series while they are 
included in most of the NRIR series. Secondly, most of the NRIR series are classified 
according to the remaining time to maturity of the loan while MIR series are classified 
according to the rate fixation period. A level shift is carried out for the NRIR rates to 
partly account for some of these differences. In a nutshell, chain linking NRIR to MIR 
rates consists of three consecutive steps: (i) Construct short and long corporate loan 
categories, (ii) Construct small and large loan categories, and (iii) Apply a level shift to 
the NRIR series. 
 
(i) Construction of short and long corporate loan categories 
 
MIR data categories need to be aggregated to make them comparable to NRIR data 
categories as the MIR data set offers a more detailed breakdown than does the NRIR data 
set. Loans with an initial rate fixation period of up to one year, including variable rate 
loans, are merged with the NRIR category of short loans with a maturity of up to one 
year. Loans with an initial rate fixation period of more than one year are merged with the 
NRIR category of long loans with a maturity of more than one year. The long MIR rate is 
a weighted average of the rate on loans with rate fixation periods over one year and up to 
five years and the rate on loans with rate fixation periods over five years based on their 
shares in the volume of new business lending. The euro area volumes are used to 
estimate the respective shares for countries for which rates are available but volumes are 
missing, i.e. Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland and Italy.  
                                                 
8 See ECB (2002) and ECB (2003) for further information on the NRIR and MIR data sets respectively. 
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(ii) Construction of small and large loan categories  
 
NRIR rates include interest on both small loans, which do not exceed EUR 1 million, 
and large loans above EUR 1 million. MIR rates on small and large loans are aggregated 
based on their respective shares in new business volume. In cases where loan volumes 
are not available we extract the small and large loan shares from the available aggregated 
interest rate in Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2008), using the following equation: 
 
llssa sisii += ,                                                      (9) 
 
where ai  is the aggregate interest rate, si is the interest rate on small loans, li  is the 
interest rate on large loans, ss is the share of small loans, and ls is the share of large loans 
in the volume of new lending. Since  
 
1=+ ls ss                                                         (10) 
 
substituting and rearranging (9) gives 
 
ls
la
s
ii
iis −
−=   and  sl
sa
l
ii
iis −
−= .                                         (11) 
 
Averages of the shares in (11) are computed for the period from January 2003 until the 
end of the Van Leuvensteijn et al. series, i.e. December 2004. Those average shares are 
then used to extend the aggregate MIR series beyond 2004. 
 
(iii) Application of a level shift 
 
In cases where there is a methodological change between NRIR and MIR data, the 
NRIR rates are adjusted by a level shift based on the difference between the NRIR and 
MIR rates as of January 2003 for all countries except Portugal. In the latter case, the level 
shift is based on the difference between the December 2002 NRIR rate and the January 
2003 MIR rate since Portuguese NRIR data end in 2002. 
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Table 8 shows the available bank loan rates after the risk-adjustment of Section 4 has 
been carried out. STL (Short-Term Loans and long-term loans with short rate fixation 
periods) and LTL (Long-Term Loans with long rate fixation periods) are chain-linked 
series that are available from October 1997. Harmonised MFI interest rates by size and 
rate fixation period, i.e. STSL (Short-Term Small Loans and long-term small loans with 
short rate fixation periods), STLL (Short-Term Large Loans and long-term large loans 
with short rate fixation periods), LTSL (Long-Term Small Loans with long rate fixation 
periods) and LTLL (Long-Term Large Loans with long rate fixation periods) are 
available only since January 2003. The frequency of all loan rate series is monthly. 
 
Table 8 Availability of bank loan rates. 
  STL LTL   STSL STLL LTSL LTLL 
 Oct. 97 – Sept. 08  Jan. 03 – Sept. 08 
              
Austria  A NA  A A A A 
Belgium  A NA  A A A NA 
Finland  NA A  A A A A 
France  A A  A A A A 
Germany  A A  A A A A 
Greece  A NA  A A A NA 
Ireland  A A  A A A A 
Italy  A A  A A A A 
Netherlands  A NA  A A A A 
Portugal  A NA  A A NA NA 
Spain  A A  A A A A 
                
 Note: A = Available; NA = Not Available. See Appendix D for a glossary. 
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Appendix B.  Transaction costs on bond financing 
 
Bond transaction costs possibly consist of four components: the management fee (i.e. 
the cost of structuring the bond by the underwriter), the selling concession (i.e. the 
difference between the guaranteed price to the issuer and the offer price to the investors), 
underpricing (i.e. the difference between the offer price and the secondary market price) 
and other expenses (i.e. legal and administration costs). The management fee and selling 
concession make up the bulk of the total transaction cost. A recent study (see Melnik and 
Nissim, 2006) finds that, since EMU, underpricing has basically disappeared for most 
bonds. 
  
Table 9 Transaction costs (in basis points) applied to the face value. 
  
 Average Median Standard 
deviation 
Maximum 
          
France   52 35 54 200 
Germany   52 34 57 275 
Italy   67 40 54 200 
Netherlands   73 35 70 275 
United 
Kingdom  
 
42 35 34 188 
           
Notes: Period: January 1999 - October 2008. Source: Dealogic Bondware. 
 
The sum of the management fee and selling concession, expressed in basis points, is 
shown by country in Table 9. The transaction costs for the median bond are basically the 
same across countries except for Italy where costs are about five basis points higher. This 
is possibly due to the smaller size of Italian bonds. The median Italian bond size of EUR 
350 million is almost half the median bond size in the other four countries (see Appendix 
C, Table 11). Transaction costs are thus about the same across countries when bond size 
is considered. 
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Appendix C. Results 
 
C.1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 10 Bank loan rates (in %). 
 AT BE FI FR DE GR IE IT NL PT ES 
 Short-Term or variable rate Loans (STL), Oct. 1997 – Sept. 2008 
Min. 2.9 2.9  2.6 3.1 3.9 3.9 3.3 2.8 4.4 3.2 
Max. 5.6 6.1  5.9 5.8 17.8 6.8 8.0 5.8 9.2 5.9 
Mean 4.3 4.2  3.8 4.0 7.5 5.2 4.7 4.1 6.1 4.5 
Median 4.5 4.4  3.5 3.9 5.6 5.1 4.5 4.0 6.0 4.5 
S.D. 0.8 0.9  0.8 0.7 4.1 0.9 1.1 0.9 1.1 0.9 
 Long-Term Loans (LTL), Oct. 1997 – Sept. 2008 
Min.   3.2 3.9 3.9  3.6 3.1   3.0 
Max.   6.2 6.1 6.1  6.4 7.9   6.2 
Mean   4.7 4.9 5.0  5.0 4.8   4.3 
Median   4.6 4.8 5.1  5.0 4.7   4.2 
S.D.   0.7 0.6 0.6  0.8 1.0   0.8 
 Short-Term or variable rate Small Loan (STSL), Jan. 2003 – Sept. 2008 
Min. 3.4 3.7 3.3 3.0 4.3 4.8 4.3 3.9 3.3 5.5 3.6 
Max. 5.7 6.0 6.0 6.3 6.6 7.2 7.2 6.2 6.1 7.9 6.3 
Mean 4.3 4.5 4.3 4.2 5.1 5.7 5.2 4.7 4.2 6.4 4.5 
Median 4.0 4.1 4.0 3.7 4.8 5.5 4.9 4.4 3.9 6.1 4.1 
S.D. 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.9 
 Short-Term or variable rate Large Loan (STLL), Jan. 2003 – Sept. 2008 
Min. 2.8 2.7 2.8 2.4 3.1 3.5 3.8 2.8 2.7 3.3 2.8 
Max. 5.4 5.4 5.6 5.8 5.7 6.1 6.7 5.5 5.5 6.5 5.6 
Mean 3.7 3.6 3.8 3.6 4.0 4.4 4.9 3.7 3.7 4.4 3.7 
Median 3.4 3.3 3.4 3.1 3.6 4.1 4.5 3.5 3.4 4.1 3.2 
S.D. 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 
 Long-Term Small Loan (LTSL), Jan. 2003 – Sept. 2008 
Min. 3.7 4.1 3.9 4.1 4.4 4.6 4.3 4.4 4.0  3.9 
Max. 5.3 5.7 6.2 5.8 5.9 6.5 7.4 6.5 6.2  6.8 
Mean 4.5 4.7 4.9 4.8 5.0 5.7 5.4 5.2 5.0  5.0 
Median 4.3 4.6 4.7 4.9 5.0 5.7 5.1 5.0 4.9  4.6 
S.D. 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.9 0.6 0.6  0.8 
 Long-Term Large Loan (LTLL), Jan. 2003 – Sept. 2008 
Min. 3.0  2.6 3.2 3.8  3.4 2.9 3.4  2.8 
Max. 5.4  6.3 5.7 5.9  6.2 6.3 5.4  6.1 
Mean 4.2  4.2 4.1 4.6  4.5 4.2 4.5  4.0 
Median 4.1  4.2 3.8 4.5  4.3 3.9 4.4  3.6 
S.D. 0.5  0.7 0.7 0.6  0.8 0.9 0.5  1.0 
Source: National Central Banks and European Central Bank. Interest rates are not adjusted for risk. S.D. 
stands for standard deviation. See Appendix D for a glossary.  
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Table 11 Descriptive statistics of 828 bond issues (1999 – 2008). 
 France Germany Italy Netherlands UK 
 Yield to maturity (in %)
 
Minimum 2.5 3.1 3.3 2.8 3.1 
Maximum 8.9 12.4 8.7 10.8 7.3 
Mean 5.1 5.3 6.0 5.2 5.2 
Median 5.1 5.2 5.9 5.0 5.2 
Standard deviation 1.0 1.3 1.0 1.3 0.9 
 Years to maturity at issue 
Minimum 2.4 2.0 2.0 3.0 1.5 
Maximum 30.0 30.0 50.0 30.0 40.0 
Mean 8.8 8.2 7.4 7.5 7.0 
Median 7.0 7.0 5.0 7.0 7.0 
Standard deviation 5.0 4.2 6.5 3.7 4.0 
 Coupon (in %) 
Minimum 3.0 3.0 3.4 3.3 3.0 
Maximum 8.8 12.0 8.4 10.5 7.3 
Mean 5.0 5.3 5.9 5.2 5.2 
Median 5.0 5.1 6.0 5.0 5.1 
Standard deviation 0.9 1.2 1.0 1.3 0.9 
 Face value (in EUR million) 
Minimum 50 20 25 70 119 
Maximum 20241 7311 6495 4970 3500 
Mean 542 632 383 619 699 
Median 500 600 350 750 650 
Standard deviation 1754 1450 1228 679 685 
 Number of rated bonds 
AAA, AA 97 35 9 15 14 
A 84 67 23 44 63 
BBB 101 46 48 17 50 
BB,B 4 6 2 4 0 
No rating 22 25 45 5 2 
Total 308 179 127 85 129 
Source: Dealogic Bondware. Bond yields are not adjusted for risk. 
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C.2. Factor analysis 
 
Table 12a Estimated factor loadings for bank loans. 
  a  1l  2l  Ad. R2  a  1l  2l  Ad. R2 
 STL (Jan. 01 – Sept. 08)  LTL (Jan. 01 – Sept. 08) 
Austria 3.98* 0.81* 0.29* 0.98         
Belgium 3.84* 0.88* 0.31* 0.97     
Finland     4.65* 0.55* -0.03 0.79 
France 3.78* 1.06* -0.08* 0.97 4.83* 0.52* -0.32* 0.99 
Germany 4.23* 0.69* 0.06 0.90 4.91* 0.53* -0.15* 0.94 
Greece 4.38* 0.92* 0.03 0.93     
Ireland 4.25* 0.92* -0.40* 0.99 4.84* 0.74* 0.01 0.94 
Italy 4.12* 0.90* 0.05* 0.97 4.54* 0.80* 0.08* 0.97 
Netherlands 3.77* 0.96* -0.29* 0.97     
Portugal 5.15* 0.88* -0.06 0.89     
Spain 3.81* 0.98* 0.17* 0.98 4.27* 0.85* 0.23* 0.99 
 STSL (Jan. 03 – Sept. 08) STLL (Jan. 03 – Sept. 08) 
Austria 4.32* 0.83* 0.26* 0.90 3.75* 1.01* 0.14 0.98 
Belgium 4.40* 0.93* 0.13* 0.97 3.64* 1.07* 0.16 0.99 
Finland 4.38* 0.82* -0.07* 0.96 3.73* 0.90* -0.08 0.98 
France 4.34* 1.24* -0.17* 0.97 3.84* 1.18* -0.01 0.98 
Germany 5.14* 0.76* 0.13* 0.98 4.01* 0.85* 0.12 0.99 
Greece 5.22* 0.96* -0.04 0.98 4.11* 1.04* 0.03 0.96 
Ireland 4.47* 1.01* -0.18* 0.98 4.17* 0.96* -0.23 0.98 
Italy 4.61* 0.90* -0.05* 0.99 3.77* 0.97* -0.08 0.98 
Netherlands 4.32* 1.04* -0.01 0.98 3.78* 1.11* -0.02 0.99 
Portugal 6.13* 1.04* -0.05 0.96 4.25* 1.23* -0.07 0.96 
Spain 4.34* 0.95* 0.17* 0.99 3.83* 1.07* 0.05 1.00 
 LTSL (Jan. 03 – Sept. 08) LTLL (Jan. 03 – Sept. 08)  
Austria 4.49* 0.45* -0.11 0.80 4.20* 0.47* 0.06 0.67 
Belgium 4.72* 0.51* -0.08 0.96     
Finland 4.94* 0.53* 0.02 0.91 4.19* 0.59* -0.41 1.00 
France 4.95* 0.39* -0.23 0.69 4.16* 0.71* -0.01 0.92 
Germany 5.05* 0.31* -0.18 0.96 4.63* 0.55* 0.02 0.91 
Greece 5.41* 0.56* 0.09 0.71     
Ireland 4.95* 0.88* 0.09 0.97 4.27* 0.73* 0.04 0.88 
Italy 5.21* 0.72* 0.10 0.99 4.26* 0.90* 0.06 0.95 
Netherlands 5.04* 0.68* -0.07 0.97 4.54* 0.51* 0.00 0.90 
Portugal         
Spain 4.95* 0.86* 0.03 0.98  4.14* 1.01* 0.11 0.98 
Notes: Estimates that are significantly different from zero at the 1% level are indicated with an asterisk. a  
is a constant, 1l  and 2l are the loadings on the first and second factors respectively. The adjusted R2 shows 
the share of the variance in risk-adjusted bank loan rates (centred on their mean) that can be explained by 
the statistically significant factors. See Appendix D for a glossary. 
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Table 12b 0.5th percentile of bootstrapped factor loadings for bank loans.  
  a  1l  2l   a  1l  2l  
 STL (Jan. 01 – Sept. 08)  LTL (Jan. 01 – Sept. 08) 
Austria  3.75 0.70 0.24     
Belgium  3.59 0.75 0.24     
Finland      4.49 0.43 -0.12 
France  3.5 0.91 -0.14  4.66 0.41 -0.35 
Germany  4.03 0.58 -0.03  4.76 0.46 -0.20 
Greece  4.13 0.79 -0.04     
Ireland  3.99 0.74 -0.45  4.64 0.64 -0.05 
Italy  3.87 0.77 0.00  4.32 0.69 0.04 
Netherlands  3.51 0.77 -0.35     
Portugal  4.91 0.73 -0.15     
Spain  3.54 0.86 0.12  4.03 0.71 0.17 
 STSL (Jan. 03 – Sept. 08)  STLL (Jan. 03 – Sept. 08) 
Austria  4.05 0.68 0.16  3.45 0.86 -0.08 
Belgium  4.12 0.76 0.06  3.32 0.9 -0.08 
Finland  4.13 0.67 -0.13  3.46 0.75 -0.15 
France  3.97 1.04 -0.21  3.49 1 -0.07 
Germany  4.91 0.63 0.06  3.75 0.71 -0.12 
Greece  4.93 0.81 -0.09  3.79 0.87 -0.09 
Ireland  4.16 0.83 -0.23  3.87 0.79 -0.31 
Italy  4.34 0.74 -0.08  3.48 0.82 -0.13 
Netherlands  4.00 0.86 -0.05  3.44 0.94 -0.07 
Portugal  5.82 0.85 -0.12  3.87 1.03 -0.18 
Spain  4.05 0.77 0.12  3.51 0.9 0.00 
 LTSL (Jan. 03 – Sept. 08)  LTLL (Jan. 03 – Sept. 08) 
Austria  4.34 0.35 -0.19  4.04 0.34 -0.35 
Belgium  4.56 0.42 -0.14     
Finland  4.77 0.42 -0.05  3.97 0.43 -0.49 
France  4.81 0.29 -0.29  3.94 0.57 -0.16 
Germany  4.93 0.22 -0.22  4.45 0.44 -0.12 
Greece  5.2 0.43 -0.42     
Ireland  4.68 0.73 -0.12  4.03 0.6 -0.21 
Italy  4.99 0.6 -0.11  3.98 0.74 -0.11 
Netherlands  4.83 0.55 -0.12  4.38 0.42 -0.07 
Portugal         
Spain  4.69 0.71 -0.01  3.83 0.82 -0.01 
Notes: a  is a constant, 1l  and 2l are the loadings on the first and second factors respectively. Estimates 
are based on 10000 draws. See Appendix D for a glossary. 
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Table 12c 99.5th percentile of bootstrapped factor loadings for bank loans. 
  a  1l  2l   a  1l  2l  
 STL (Jan. 01 – Sept. 08)  LTL (Jan. 01 – Sept. 08) 
Austria  4.21 0.90 0.33     
Belgium  4.10 0.99 0.38     
Finland      4.81 0.66 0.04 
France  4.07 1.18 -0.03  4.99 0.61 -0.26 
Germany  4.43 0.79 0.13  5.07 0.59 -0.09 
Greece  4.64 1.02 0.12     
Ireland  4.53 1.07 -0.33  5.05 0.83 0.05 
Italy  4.36 0.99 0.10  4.76 0.89 0.12 
Netherlands  4.05 1.10 -0.22     
Portugal  5.40 1.02 0.02     
Spain  4.07 1.07 0.22  4.51 0.96 0.29 
 STSL (Jan. 03 – Sept. 08)  STLL (Jan.03 – Sept. 08) 
Austria  4.59 0.94 0.32  4.07 1.12 0.19 
Belgium  4.70 1.04 0.18  3.98 1.18 0.21 
Finland  4.64 0.95 0.00  4.01 0.99 0.11 
France  4.73 1.37 -0.11  4.22 1.30 0.06 
Germany  5.38 0.85 0.18  4.28 0.95 0.16 
Greece  5.53 1.07 0.01  4.44 1.16 0.14 
Ireland  4.79 1.15 -0.10  4.48 1.10 0.30 
Italy  4.89 1.01 -0.01  4.07 1.07 0.05 
Netherlands  4.66 1.16 0.05  4.13 1.22 0.03 
Portugal  6.46 1.17 0.04  4.64 1.37 0.06 
Spain  4.64 1.05 0.21  4.17 1.18 0.09 
 LTSL (Jan. 03 – Sept. 08)  LTLL (Jan. 03 – Sept. 08) 
Austria  4.65 0.53 0.12  4.39 0.59 0.32 
Belgium  4.88 0.58 0.10     
Finland  5.11 0.62 0.14  4.40 0.76 0.13 
France  5.10 0.47 0.24  4.40 0.82 0.13 
Germany  5.16 0.38 0.20  4.81 0.65 0.13 
Greece  5.62 0.67 0.32     
Ireland  5.23 1.00 0.17  4.51 0.83 0.28 
Italy  5.44 0.80 0.15  4.56 1.02 0.17 
Netherlands  5.26 0.77 0.13  4.71 0.59 0.06 
Portugal         
Spain  5.23 0.96 0.10  4.46 1.14 0.20 
Notes: a  is a constant, 1l  and 2l are the loadings on the first and second factors respectively. Estimates 
are based on 10000 draws. See Appendix D for a glossary. 
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Table 13 Factor loadings for bonds. 
 France Germany Italy Netherlands UK 
 Jan. 1999 – Oct. 2008 
 Estimated factor loadings 
a  5.05* 5.01* 5.07* 5.01* 4.98* 
1l  0.24* 0.24* 0.21* 0.21* 0.16* 
2l  0.08 0.02 -0.21 0.06 0.05 
 0.5th percentile of bootstrapped factor loadings 
a  4.94 4.88 4.95 4.9 4.88 
1l  0.13 0.11 0.05 0.09 0.05 
2l  -0.15 -0.2 -0.29 -0.23 -0.17 
 95.5th percentile of bootstrapped factor loadings 
a  5.16 5.12 5.19 5.12 5.08 
1l  0.33 0.34 0.32 0.32 0.24 
2l  0.16 0.17 0.28 0.24 0.24 
Adjusted R2 0.70 0.61 0.55 0.52 0.42 
Note: Estimated factor loadings that are significantly different from zero at the 1% level are indicated with 
an asterisk. a  is a constant, 1l  and 2l are the loadings on the first and second factors respectively. 
Estimates are based on 10000 draws. The adjusted R2 shows the share of the variance in risk-adjusted bond 
yields (centred on their mean) that can be explained by the statistically significant factors. 
 
Appendix D. Glossary 
 
STL  = Short-Term Loans and long-term loans with short rate fixation periods. 
LTL  = Long-Term Loans with long rate fixation periods. 
STSL  = Short-Term Small Loans and  
    long-term small loans with short rate fixation periods. 
STLL  = Short-Term Large Loans and 
    long-term large loans with short rate fixation periods. 
LTSL  = Long-Term Small Loans with long rate fixation periods. 
LTLL  = Long-Term Large Loans with long rate fixation periods. 
 
ECB  = European Central Bank 
MFIs  = Monetary Financial Institutions 
NCBs = National Central Banks 
NFCs = Non-Financial Corporations 
SMEs  = Small and Medium-sized Enterprises 
LSEs  = Large Scale Enterprises 
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